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Abstract
We build upon control theoretic concepts like robustness and dynamics to better ac-
commodate all the situations where the coalitions’ values are uncertain and subject to
changes over time. The proposed robust dynamic framework provides an alternative per-
spective on the study of sequences of coalitional games or interval valued games. For a
sequence of coalitional games, either balanced or unbalanced, we analyze the key roles
of instantaneous and average games. Instantaneous games are obtained by freezing the
coalitions’ values at a given time and come into play when coalitions’ values are known.
On the other hand, average games are derived from averaging the coalitions’ values up
to a given time and are key part of our analysis when coalitions’ values are unknown.
The main theoretical contribution of our paper is a design method of allocation rules that
return solutions in the core and/or ǫ-core of the instantaneous and average games. Theo-
retical results are then specialized to a simulated example to shed light on the impact of
the design method and on the performance of the resulting allocation rules.
Keywords cooperative games, dynamic games, unbalancedness.
1 Introduction
In this work, we investigate robustness and dynamics in coalitional games. We build upon
these two concepts to better accommodate all the situations where the coalitions’ values
are uncertain and subject to changes over time. More precisely, robustness derives from
assuming that the values of the coalitions are not known as dealt with in the recent literature
on stochastic coalitional games [9, 10]. We deviate from this stochastic framework since we
assume that coalitions’ values are unknown but bounded within a priori known polytopic
sets. So, differently from [9, 10], no stochastic properties are available and the coalitions’
values are not random processes. The term dynamics relates to the time-varying nature of
the coalitions’ values, as captured first in [6, 7]. However, our approach differs from [6, 7]
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mainly in the assumption that no relation exists between coalitions’ values at consecutive
times except the fact that they always belong to given sets.
The motivation of our research comes from the idea that the proposed robust dynamic
framework provides a complementary perspective on the studies of sequences of coalitional
games, as introduced by [8], and of interval valued games, described in [1]. A first attempt
along this line of research is [3], where we translate sequences of balanced coalitional games
into a (dynamic) system theoretic framework. In the current paper, we extend this framework
to unbalanced games and revisit results in [3] using a new language and new concepts. Thus,
notions like control strategy, ǫ-stabilizability, and robustness [2] will be tightly linked to
allocation rules, ǫ-core, and balancedness [8].
Our analysis and results are divided in two parts, namely balanced games, and unbalanced
games. In the first part concerning balanced games, we start by providing necessary and
sufficient conditions for the sequence of games to be balanced. Such conditions involve sets
inclusions and concern either sets of allowable allocations or sets of coalitions’ values. Next,
we propose a design method for allocations belonging to the core of the instantaneous game
assuming that coalitions’ values are known. This game is obtained by freezing the coalitions’
values at a given time. If the coalitions’ values are not known, we turn to consider the average
games, that is, the games obtained by averaging the coalitions’ values up to a given time. In
this case, we can guarantee that allocation vectors deviate from the core of the average games
of at most a given tolerance ǫ. That is, the allocations belong to the ǫ-core of the average
game. We end the first part with results on the infinite horizon version of the problem. After
averaging coalitions’ values up to infinity, average allocations are shown to belong to the
core of the average game. To summarize, lack of information on coalitions’ values prevents
allocations to be in the core if we look at each instantaneous game. Nevertheless the allocation
rule is able to compensate such a lack of information on the long run if the average allocation
converges to the core of the average game.
The second set of results concerns unbalanced games. Dropping the balancedness assump-
tion, we are no longer able to guarantee any tolerance ǫ, which means that the allocation vector
can deviate any large enough value from the core of the average game. In other words, the
allocation vector is no longer guaranteed to be in the ǫ-core of the average game. However, we
can still prove that the average allocation converges in probability to the core of the average
game.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the problem. In Sections 3
and 4 we elaborate on respectively the balanced and unbalanced cases. Section 5 contains a
numerical example to illustrate the results. Finally, Section 6 provides conclusions.
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2 Problem statement
The problem statement consists in three different parts each one giving rise to one of
the three following subsections. We start by introducing the sequence of games we focus on.
Then, we generalize the framework to include fast periodical allocations. Finally, we comment
on the nature of bounds on allocations and turn to the dynamic aspects of our problem.
2.1 Sequence of games
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n players. A coalition S is a nonempty subset of the player
set N . Let the inclusion S ⊆ N mean that S is a coalition. Denote by m = 2n−1 the number
of coalitions. A cooperative game, or game in coalitional form, is a pair < N, v >, where v is
the characteristic function assigning a value v(S) to each coalition S. Such a game is called
balanced if and only if the core is nonempty. The core can be expressed as below, with ∆n
being the simplex in Rn:
C(v) = {a ∈ Rn :
a
v(N)
∈ ∆n,
∑
i∈S
ai ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N}.
There exist many classes of balanced games; see for example [4, 5].
Now, consider a sequence of games in coalitional form where the vector of coalitional
values v(t) = [v(t, S)]S⊆N is a function of time t and fluctuates in a bounded polyhedron V:
< N,v(t) >, t = 1, 2, . . . with v(t) ∈ V for all t. (1)
This sequence of games has a vector of average coalitions’ values v¯, being defined by
v¯ = lim
T−→∞
1
T
T∑
k=0
v(k). (2)
Before recalling the next result we need to define the following notation. Let us first
introduce the column vector of nonnegative surplus variables s = [s1, . . . , sm−1]
′ ≥ 0 where
ζ ′ is the transposed of a given vector ζ and let I be the (m− 1)-dimensional identity matrix.
Also, denote by B ∈ Rm×n the matrix whose rows are the characteristic vectors eS ∈ Rn.
Recall that the components of a characteristic vector are eSi = 1 if i ∈ S and e
S
i = 0 if i /∈ S.
Finally, let us introduce matrix A ∈ Rm×(n+m−1) defined by
A =

B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−I
−−−−
0 . . . 0

 . (3)
With the above notation in mind, we are ready to recall the following result.
If < N, v > is a balanced game then finding an allocation vector a in the core corresponds
to finding an “augmented” allocation vector u :=
[
a
s
]
∈ Rn+m−1 in the set (4), where amin ∈
R
n is an apriori given vector:
U(v) =
{
u : Au = v, u ≥
[
amin
0
]}
. (4)
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To elaborate more on the meaning of the surplus variables, note that each surplus variable
sS corresponds to a coalition S of players and describes the difference between the allocated
value and the coalitional value, sS =
∑
i∈S ai − v(S). Also, notice that there are only m− 1
surplus variables because coalition N has no surplus (
∑
i∈N ai−v(N) = 0) due to the efficiency
condition of the core.
2.2 Fast periodical allocations
Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume that allocations to players are made at an
integer rate 1/Θ, Θ < 1. This is larger than the rate of change of the coalitional values,
which equals one by default. Then Θ is the time between two successive allocations. To
facilitate our analysis, we stretch the time scale by the rate 1/Θ and consider a new sequence
of instantaneous games,
v(k) = v(t)Θ, k =
t− 1
Θ
+ 1, . . . ,
t
Θ
, t = 1, 2, . . . . (5)
This new sequence of games has the following interpretation. In the original time interval
(t− 1, t] the vector of coalitional values equals v(t). We distribute these values equally over
the 1/Θ allocations that occur in this time period, so this results in values v(t)Θ for each
point in time where allocations are made. This ensures that the total amount allocated to
the players in the new interval ((t− 1)/Θ, t/Θ] does not exceed the available amount v(t,N).
All the above reasoning leads us to the following crucial observation. Denote VΘ = Θ · V
and v¯ = Θv¯, the sequence of games (1)-(2) is equivalent to the sequence of games
< N, v(k) >, k = 1, 2, . . . with v(k) ∈ VΘ for each k = 1, 2, . . .
v¯ = limT−→∞
1
T
∑T
k=0 v(k).
(6)
In the remainder of this paper, we will always refer to the sequence of instantaneous games
expressed by (6).
2.3 Dynamics of coalitions’ excesses
In this section we briefly comment on the nature of lower and upper bounds on allocations
and introduce the dynamic model. More specifically, we assume that the allocation vector is
bounded within a polyhedron
U := {u : umin ≤ u ≤ umax}
with umin :=
[
amin
0
]
≤ 0 ≤ umax. Define x(k + 1) ∈ R
m as the state variable of the system,
with x(0) the excess at time 0. This vector of variables describes the aggregate coalitions’
excesses over the games v(1), . . . , v(k) up to time k:
x(k + 1) = x(k) +Au(k)− v(k), v(k) ∈ VΘ, u(k) ∈ U , k = 1, 2, . . . . (7)
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Here we write u(k) =
[a(k)
s(k)
]
, a(k) = [ai(k)]i∈N with ai(k) the revenue allocated to player
i, and s(k) = [sS(k)]S⊂N .
With the introduction of dynamics (7), we conclude this first part of the work regarding
the problem statement and move to the presentation of results for the balanced case.
3 Balanced games
3.1 Core and ǫ-core of the instantaneous game
In this section we analyze sequences of games (6) that are balanced. The lemma below
provides necessary and sufficient conditions for this to be true in terms of the sets VΘ and U .
Lemma 1 All the games in the sequence (6) are balanced if and only if
VΘ ⊆ AU . (8)
Then there exists an allocation rule u(k) := Φ(v(k)) in the core of the game < N, v(k) >
for all k, i.e.,
a(k) ∈ C(v(k)), ∀k. (9)
Proof From the definitions it follows that balancedness is equivalent to (8). Next, we prove
(9).
(Sufficiency) If (8) is true, then there exists a vector u(k) ∈ {u ∈ U : Au = v(k)} ⊆
U(v(k)). Thus a(k) ∈ C(v(k)) by (4).
(Necessity) If (8) is false, i.e., VΘ 6⊆ AU , then there exists a vertex v(r) of VΘ such that
Au 6= v(r) for all u ∈ U ; U ∩ U(v(r)) = ∅. On each time k where v(k) = v(r) there exists no
a(k) ∈ C(v(k)); the core C(v(k)) is empty. 
Thus, if all the games are balanced then we can select allocations in the core C(v(k)) of
the instantaneous game < N, v(k) > at any time k. Allocations in the core C(v(k)) are not
applicable if v(k) is not known at time k. In this case, allocations outside the core may be
approximately close to the core according to a certain tolerance ǫ. This is captured by the
definition of ǫ-core as provided in [8].
Definition 1 (ǫ-core [8]) The ǫ-core is the set of all allocations such that the total amount
received by each coalition exceeds or is equal to the value of the coalition reduced by a given
tolerance ǫ:
Cǫ(v) := {a ∈ R
n :
a
v(N)
∈ ∆n,
∑
i∈S
ai ≥ v(S)− ǫ for all S ⊆ N}.
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We say that a game is ǫ-balanced if and only if its ǫ-core is nonempty.
Given a function f(k), denote by f¯ the long term average of a given function f(k), i.e.,
limk−→∞
1
k
∑k
j=0 f(j) and f¯
k the average up to time k. The game < N, v¯k > is called the
average game (up to time k).
Take ǫ = maxv∈VΘ ‖v‖, the infinity norm of the vector v, and consider a tolerance ε(k) :=
ǫ
k
. Average games and ε-balancedness are related as follows.
Lemma 2 Assume v(k) is unknown at time k. There exists a time k˜ such that all average
games < N, v¯k > are ε(k)-balanced for all k ≥ k˜ if and only if
VΘ ⊆ int{AU}. (10)
Furthermore, there exists an allocation rule u(k) := Φ(x(k)) such that the average alloca-
tions a¯k are in the ε(k)-core of the average game < N, v¯k > for all k ≥ k˜, i.e.,
a¯k ∈ Cε(k)(v¯
k), ∀k ≥ k˜. (11)
Proof
(Sufficiency) Assume first that k˜ exists (we prove its existence in the second part of the
proof), and take for it the first time instant where −x(k˜) ∈ VΘ. We show that −x(k˜+1) ∈ VΘ
for some u(k˜) ∈ U . By (10), there exists an allocation rule u(k˜) ∈ U such that Au(k˜) = −x(k˜).
Then x(k˜ + 1) = −v(k˜) by (7) and also −x(k˜ + 1) ∈ VΘ. We can repeat the same argument
inductively for k˜ + 2 and so on. This proves that −x(k) ∈ VΘ for all k ≥ k˜.
Now, we prove the existence of k˜. Consider any time instant k such that −x(k) 6∈ VΘ.
Define a new variable w(k) = x(k − 1) +Au(k − 1) so that w(k)− x(k) = v(k − 1) ∈ VΘ (6).
Now, choose u(k) := u1(k) + u2(k) ∈ U with u1(k) satisfying
Au1(k) = w(k) − x(k) = v(k − 1) ∈ V
Θ.
Using the above equality, the dynamics for w(k) turns out to be
w(k + 1) = x(k) +Au(k)
= x(k) +Au1(k) +Au2(k)
= w(k) +Au2(k).
Now select u2(k) such that the norm of w(k + 1) is minimized, i.e.,
u2(k) = argmin
u∈U
‖w(k) +Au‖. (12)
If u2 is chosen such that Au2 is in the opposite direction of w then the formulation of
w(k + 1) implies that the norm of w is reduced. Because of condition 0 ∈ int{AU}, which
follows from (10) and 0 ∈ VΘ, we certainly have
‖w(k + 1)‖ − ‖w(k)‖ ≤ β < 0
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for some β, until ‖w(k˜)‖ = 0 for a large enough k˜. This in turn implies that −x(k), whose
dynamics can be rewritten as −x(k) = −w(k) + v(k − 1), is ultimately bounded in VΘ.
Hence we have shown that there exists a time k˜ such that −x(k) ∈ VΘ, and ‖x(k)‖ ≤ ǫ
as well, for all k ≥ k˜. Now, using ε(k) = ǫ
k
, the latter inequality implies the inequalities
−ε(k) ≤
∑
i∈S a¯
k
i−s¯
k
S−v¯
k
S ≤ ε(k) for all S ⊂ N from which we have
∑
i∈S a¯
k
i ≥ v¯
k
S+s¯
k
S−ε(k) ≥
v¯kS − ε(k). This proves that all average games < N, v¯
k > for all k ≥ k˜ are ε(k)-balanced and
also that (11) holds true.
(Necessity) Assume that (10) is false. Then there certainly exists a vertex v(r) of the
polytopic set VΘ such that either there no exists u1(k) ∈ U for which Au1(k) = v
(r) or, if it
exists, it lies on the frontier, i.e., u1(k) ∈ ∂U . In both cases u2(k) = 0, which means that we
cannot select u2(k) as in (12). Thus if v(k) = v
(r) for all k > 0 then we cannot bound x(k) in
VΘ for any k large enough. Then the average game < N, v¯k > is not ε(k)-balanced for some
k > 0, and condition (11) is not true. 
Under certain conditions we can design allocation rules such that averaging the allocations
over the long run results in a desired value, called the nominal allocation. We analyze such
conditions in the next section.
3.2 Nominal allocations
Let anom ∈ R
N
+ be an apriori given allocation vector, referred to as the nominal allocation,
and denote by v(r) with r ∈ Ext{VΘ} a vertex of the polytopic set VΘ. To be more precise,
Ext{VΘ} is the set of indices of all vertices of VΘ. Assume that v¯ = vnom, the vector of known
nominal coalitions’ values. Consider a matrix D ∈ R(n+m−1)×m subject to the conditions (see
also [3, Lemma 1]):
AD = I ∈ Rm×m (13)
umin ≤ D(v
(r) − vnom) + unom ≤ umax ∀r ∈ Ext{V
Θ}, (14)
where unom =
[
anom
snom
]
∈ U such that Aunom = vnom. We investigate under which conditions
a¯(k) = anom ∈ C(vnom) for some vnom ∈ V
Θ. (15)
That is, when does the long run average allocation converge to the nominal allocation?
Lemma 3 Assume that v(k) is known at time k, condition (10) is satisfied, and the
vector of average coalitions’ values v¯ is equal to a given vnom ∈ V
Θ. Furthermore, consider
unom =
[
anom
snom
]
∈ U such that Aunom = vnom. There exists an allocation rule u(k) := Φ(v(k))
such that (9) and (15) hold if and only if there exists a matrix D ∈ R(n+m−1)×m that satisfies
(13) and (14). The allocation rule is linear on v(k), that is,
u(k) = unom +D(v(k) − vnom). (16)
7
Proof (Sufficiency) Assume that (13) and (14) are true. We show that the allocation rule
(16) satisfies (9) and (15). To prove (9), it suffices to show that Au(k) = v(k) with u(k) as
in (16). This is evident as by substitution we have
Au(k) = A(unom +D(v(k)− vnom)) = Aunom + v(k) − vnom = v(k).
To prove (15), observe that u¯ = unom +D(v¯ − vnom) = unom which implies (15).
(Necessity) Assume now that (9) and (15) are true. We show that (13) and (14) are
satisfied, and that the allocation rule is of type (16).
Let W = [v(1) v(2) . . . v(s)] be a matrix whose columns are the vertices of VΘ. Also,
because of (9), we can consider a matrix U = [u(1) u(2) . . . u(s)] whose columns are the
allocations u(j) ∈ U that satisfy Au(j) = v(j) for all j = 1, . . . , s. Take, without loss of
generality, vnom = 0 and unom = 0. This is possible after translating the origin of the v-space
and u-space in vnom and unom respectively. Now, condition (15) means that u¯ = 0 if and only
if v¯ = 0. Note that w¯ and u¯ can always be rewritten as convex combinations of the columns
of W and U (vertices of VΘ and U). Then, u¯ = 0 ⇔ v¯ = 0 implies that the kernels of W
and U coincide, i.e., Ker(W ) = Ker(U). Thus there exists a matrix Dˆ ∈ R(m×n) such that
U = DˆW . SinceW = AU = ADˆW , Dˆ is a right inverse of A. This proves (13). To prove (14),
we use convex combinations with coefficients
∑s
j=1 αj = 1, and αj ≥ 0 for all j = 1, . . . , s.
Then u(k) = Dˆv(k) = Dˆ
∑s
j=1 αj(v
(j)) =
∑s
j=1 αjDˆ(v
(j)) =
∑s
j=1 αju
(s) ∈ U and so (14) is
proved as well. Finally note that the resulting allocation rule u(k) = Dˆv(k) corresponds to
(16) if we translate the origins of the u-space and v-space back to the zero-vector. 
We proceed by analysing what happens if v(k) is not known at time k.
Lemma 4 Assume that v(k) is unknown at time k, condition (10) is satisfied, and the
average coalitions values v¯ are equal to a given vnom ∈ V
Θ. Furthermore, consider unom =[
anom
snom
]
∈ U such that Aunom = vnom. There exists an allocation rule u(k) := Φ(x(k), .)
such that (11) with ǫ = maxv∈VΘ ‖v‖ and (15) hold if and only if there exists a matrix
D ∈ R(n+m−1)×m that satisfies (13) and (14).
Proof Consider the matrices A, as in (3), and D satisfying (13) and (14). Using a standard
property of linear algebra, we can find two matrices C and F that “square” A and D, and
satisfy [
A
C
] [
D F
]
= I. (17)
The introduction of matrix C is useful to construct the augmented system
x(k + 1) = x(k) +Au(k)− v(k)
y(k + 1) = y(k) + Cu(k).
(18)
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On the other hand, we can use matrix F to define a new variable z(k) ∈ R(n+m−1) as
expressed below
z(k) =
[
D F
] [ x(k)
y(k)
]
⇔
[
x(k)
y(k)
]
=
[
A
C
]
z(k).
This variable evolves according to the dynamic equation (19). Now, because of its “simple
form”, such dynamics will soon lead us to the construction of an opportune allocation rule:
z(k + 1) =
[
D F
] [ x(k + 1)
y(k + 1)
]
=
[
D F
] [ x(k)
y(k)
]
+
[
D F
] [ A
C
]
u(k)−
[
D F
] [ v(k)
0
]
= z(k) + u(k)−Dv(k). (19)
It turns useful to rewrite the above dynamics componentwise. So, we have
zi(k + 1) = zi(k) + ui(k)−Div(k), (20)
where Di is the ith row of D and ui,min ≤ ui ≤ ui,max. With reference to (20), a possible
allocation rule is
ui(k) = sat[ui,min,ui,max][−zi(k)] :=


ui,min if zi(k) > −ui,min
ui,max if zi(k) < −ui,max
−zi(k) if −ui,max ≤ zi(k) ≤ −ui,min
. (21)
Let the time k˜ be such that −ui,max ≤ zi(k˜) ≤ −ui,min (hereafter we prove the existence
of such a k˜). Take without loss of generality unom = vnom = 0. Because of (14), note that the
dynamics (20) and (21) imply −ui,max ≤ zi(k˜+1) = −Div(k˜) ≤ −ui,min. Repeating the same
argument forward in time results in −ui,max ≤ zi(k + 1) = −Div(k) ≤ −ui,min for all k ≥ k˜.
Now, we show that the time k˜ exists. Take zi(k) < −ui,max. Using (21) in the dynamics
(20) and again because of (14), we obtain zi(k + 1) − zi(k) = ui,max − Div(k) > 0 until
−ui,max ≤ zi(k˜) for a large enough k˜. The proof for zi(k) > −ui,min is similar.
We have proved that for a large enough k˜ we may reach the condition
‖z(k)‖ ≤ max
τ≥k˜
‖Dv(τ)‖ for all k ≥ k˜. (22)
This last condition also implies that for all k ≥ k˜
‖x(k)‖ ≤ max
k≥k˜
‖Az(k)‖ ≤ max
v∈VΘ
‖ADv‖ = max
v∈VΘ
‖v‖ = max
j=1,...,s
‖v(j)‖ = ǫ,
which proves condition (11).
To prove (15), we sum (19) for k = 1, 2, . . . to obtain
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
u(k)−
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
Dv(k) =
z(T )− z(0)
T
→ 0
9
as T →∞, since the numerator is a finite quantity whereas the denominator tends to infinity.
Therefore u¯ = Dv¯, which concludes the proof. 
4 Unbalanced games
In this section, we move to consider sequences of games that are, in general, not balanced.
This is the case, for instance, when condition (8) in Lemma 1 does not hold. The following
assumption applies.
Assumption 1 Assume that the following condition is satisfied:
VΘ 6⊆ AU. (23)
It is reasonable to assume that the expected coalitions’ values are not correlated with the
state and coincide at each time with the long term average. We establish this in the following
assumption.
Assumption 2 The vector of coalitions’ values v(k) is a mean ergodic stochastic process,
i.e., E[v(k)] = v¯, that is not correlated with x(k), i.e., E[x(k)T v(k)] = 0.
We can always translate the origin of the u and v spaces without loss of generality. So,
let us move the origins in unom and vnom as established next.
Assumption 3 For ease of calculations set unom = vnom = 0 and assume that v¯ =
vnom = 0 ∈ int{AU}.
Note that 0 ∈ int{AU} means that the interior of AU includes at least the nominal
coalitions’ values. So, this is a relaxation of condition (10) where the interior of AU includes
all coalitions’ values. Further, it means that the average game is balanced.
Before introducing the next result we define the distance between a point x ∈ Rn and a
set S in Rn as d(x, S) = miny∈S ‖x− y‖, and define the function V (x) = x
Tx/2.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 2 and 3, there exists an allocation rule u(k) := Φ(.)
such that d(a¯k, C(v¯k))→ 0, for k →∞ with probability one. Furthermore, such an allocation
rule satisfies (15). A possible control is
u(k) = argmin
u∈U
V (x(k) +Au). (24)
Proof The first part of the theorem, which establishes d(a¯k, C(v¯k))→ 0 for k →∞, is proved
if we show that x(k) tends to zero with probability one. Let u(k) be defined as in (24), and
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recall that 0 ∈ int{AU}. For x 6= 0 the new variable w(k) = x(k − 1) + Au(k − 1) satisfies
the condition
V (w(k + 1)) = V (x(k) +Au(k)) < V (x(k) +A0) = V (x(k))
by definition of u(k), and because 0 ∈ U . Further, w(k+1) = x(k)+Au(k) = x(k+1)+ v(k)
by definition of w(k) and (7). This implies x(k+1) = w(k+1)− v(k). Applying the triangle
inequality results in
V (x(k + 1)) < V (w(k + 1)) + V (v(k)) < V (x(k)) + V (v(k)).
If we take expectations we obtain E(V (x(k+1))) < E(V (x(k)))+E(V (v(k))). Finally, recall
that limΘ→0E(V (v(k))) = 0 as v(k) ∈ V
Θ and VΘ = ΘV. Then, taking the limit we have
limΘ→0E(V (x(k + 1))) < limΘ→0(E(V (x(k))) + E(V (v(k)))) = limΘ→0E(V (x(k))). This
last inequality implies that x(k) tends to zero with probability one (and x(k) is said to be
stochastically stable).
The proposed strategy does imply stochastic stability but it does not necessarily satisfy
(15). To enforce (15) we use (20) which we rewrite below
zi(k + 1) = zi(k) + ui(k)− δi(k),
where δi(k) = Div(k), andDi is the ith row of any matrixD satisfying (13) but not necessarily
(14). Note that E[δi] = DiE[v(k)] = 0. If we consider the function V (zi) = zi(k)
2/2, and
slightly modify (24) to
ui(k) = arg min
ui,min≤µ≤ui,max
V (zi(k) + µ),
then we see that E(V (zi(k + 1))) ≤ E(V (zi(k))) + E(V (δi(k))). Taking limits results in
limΘ→0E(V (zi(k + 1))) ≤ limΘ→0E(V (zi(k))) + lim
Θ→0
E(V (δi(k)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
≤ limΘ→0E(V (zi(k)))
which means that the zi(k) subsystem is stable with probability one. Then,
1
T
[zi(T )−zi(0)]→
0, which implies 1
T
∑T
k=0 [ui(k)− δi(k)]→ 0 with probability one and (15) is proved. 
5 Numerical example.
Consider three players and the following intervals for the coalitions’ values.
v({1}) = 0 v({2}) = 0 v({3}) = 0
v({1, 2}) ∈ [0, 5] v({1, 3}) ∈ [0, 5] v({2, 3}) ∈ [0, 7] v(N) ∈ [0, 12].
These intervals may be interpreted as the intervals of cost-savings of the coalitions in a single-
period one-warehouse multi-retailer inventory system, cf. [3]. Let the nominal coalitions’
values and the nominal average allocation vector be
vnom = [0, 0, 0, 2, 3, 4, 10]
T , unom = [3, 5, 2, 3, 5, 2, 6, 2, 3]
T .
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Figure 1: Time plot of z(.). The variable is ǫ-stabilized with ǫ = 0.5.
Note that Aunom = vnom. We translate the origin of the u-v space to unom-vnom.
First, we calculate D as illustrated in the appendix. Then we compute the matrices C
and F that square B and D using the method explained in detail in the appendix of [3]. For
the maximum sample time we get Θ∗ > 0.1 and choose Θ = 0.1.
We divide this simulation section in two parts: balanced and unbalanced games. In a first
set of simulations, we consider the bounding polyhedron U := {u ∈ R10 : −0.5·1 ≤ u ≤ 0.5·1},
where 1 is the 10-dimensional vector of ones. Condition (10) holds true and the resulting
games in the sequence are balanced. Now, by using the results of Lemma 4, we implement
the dynamic allocation rule (21) to simulate the evolution of the system as displayed in
Figures 1-4. More specifically, Fig. 1 shows the time plot of the variable z(.). This variable
was defined in the proof of Lemma 4 and its evolution follows (19). The variable is ǫ-stabilized
with ǫ = 0.5. We recall that ǫ-stabilizing z(.) is a key part in the proof of Lemma 4 that
shows the validity of (11) and (15). For the same simulation scenario, Fig. 2 shows the time
plot of u¯k − unom, where u¯
k is the average of u(k) up to time k. All plots tend to zero for
increasing time which means that the average u¯k tends to unom according to the condition
u¯ = unom. Let us turn to Fig. 3, which depicts the time plot of v¯
k − vnom, where v¯
k is the
average of v(k) up to time k. All plots tend to zero for increasing time which means that
the average v¯k tends to vnom according to the hypothesis of Lemma 4, v¯ = vnom. We can
conclude our comments on the first set of simulations with Fig. 4 which illustrates the time
plot of x(.). The variable is ǫ-stabilized with ǫ < 0.5.
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Figure 2: Time plot of u¯k − unom. The average tends to unom for increasing time according
to the condition u¯ = unom.
In a second set of simulations, we consider the bounding polyhedron U := {u : −0.2 · 1 ≤
u ≤ 0.2 ·1}. Condition (10) holds no longer (the bounds in U are too tight) and the resulting
games in the sequence are not balanced. We can start by illustrating the time plot of z(.)
in Fig. 5. Peaks show that the variable is not ǫ-stabilized with ǫ = 0.5. Next Fig. 6 shows
the time plot of u¯k − unom, where u¯
k is the average of u(k) up to time k. All plots tend to
zero for increasing time which means that the average u¯(k) tends to unom according to the
condition u¯ = unom. Further, Fig. 7 illustrates the time plot of v¯
k − vnom, where v¯
k is the
average of v(k) up to time k. All plots tend to zero for increasing time which means that
the average v¯(k) tends to vnom according to the hypothesis of Theorem 1, v¯ = vnom. Finally,
Fig. 8 displays the time plot of x(.). Peaks illustrate that the variable is not ǫ-stabilized with
ǫ < 0.5.
6 Conclusions and future directions
In this work, we investigate what is necessary to capture the dynamic and uncertain nature
of the coalitions’ values in most real contexts. We highlight how ǫ-stabilizability of a control
strategy collapses into ǫ-balancedness and ǫ-core allocations inclusions. We believe that the
robust dynamic approach proposed here is likely to become an alternative perspective on the
study of sequences of coalitional games and interval valued games.
Future research will include contributions to distributed allocation algorithms. This line of
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Figure 3: Time plot of v¯k − vnom.
research is inspired by so-called consensus algorithms already present in the control literature.
The underlying idea is that people exchange money only with neighbors (this motivates
the meaning of the word distributed) until an allocation in the core is reached. So, no
centralized thinking, no supervisor, but a decentralized allocation procedure that behaves
like a centralized one.
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Appendix
To calculate matrix D we formulate a linear programming problem as illustrated in details
in Bauso and Timmer (2009) [3]) and obtain
D =


0.22222 −0.11111 −0.11111 0.11111 0.11111 −0.22222 0.33333
−0.11111 0.22222 −0.11111 0.13695 −0.18346 0.16279 0.46253
−0.11111 −0.11111 0.22222 −0.24806 0.072351 0.059432 0.20413
−0.77778 −0.11111 −0.11111 0.11111 0.11111 −0.22222 0.33333
−0.11111 −0.77778 −0.11111 0.13695 −0.18346 0.16279 0.46253
−0.11111 −0.11111 −0.77778 −0.24806 0.072351 0.059432 0.20413
0.11111 0.11111 −0.22222 −0.75194 −0.072351 −0.059432 0.79587
0.11111 −0.22222 0.11111 −0.13695 −0.81654 −0.16279 0.53747
−0.22222 0.11111 0.11111 −0.11111 −0.11111 −0.77778 0.66667


.
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